Reasons for differing interpretations

There are 7 differing reasons for scholars to differ on interpretations:

  1. Different Understanding of Indication of Texts
  2. Different Understanding of Indication of Command and Prohibition
  3. Different Understanding of Indication of Prophetic Actions
  4. Different Judgement on Soundness of Hadith
  5. Different Understanding of Role of Companions’ Opinion
  6. Differences on Consideration of Secondary Evidences
  7. Differences on Consideration of Decisive and Non-Decisive Texts For the first, scholars may differ in their comprehension of what a particular text implies. This involves interpreting specific verses of the Quran or hadith differently, leading to various conclusions about their meanings and implications.

For the second, there may be diverse interpretations regarding what constitutes a clear command or prohibition. Some scholars might view certain statements as obligatory commands, while others see them as recommendations or advice.

For the third, scholars might disagree on how to interpret the actions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). While some may view them as mandatory practices to be followed, others might consider them as situational actions not meant for universal application.

For the fourth, there can be varying assessments of the authenticity and reliability of hadith. Scholars use different criteria and methodologies to evaluate hadith, which can lead to differing opinions on whether a particular hadith should be accepted as sound or not.

For the fifth, scholars may hold different views on the weight and significance of the opinions of the Prophet’s Companions. While some place great emphasis on these opinions as sources of Islamic law, others might consider them less authoritative compared to other sources.

For the sixth, there might be discrepancies in how scholars regard secondary evidences like consensus (ijma), analogical reasoning (qiyas), and juristic preference (istihsan). These differences affect how they interpret primary texts and derive legal rulings.

For the seventh, scholars can have divergent views on which texts are decisive (qat’i) and leave no room for interpretation, and which ones are speculative (zanni) and open to various interpretations. This distinction impacts how rigid or flexible their legal and theological conclusions are.

4 different understanding of ‘indication of texts’

There are four different understandings of the indications of texts in Islamic scholarship:

  1. general (‘amm) texts,
  2. specific (khass) texts,
  3. unconditioned (mutlaq) texts, and
  4. conditioned (muqayyad) texts. General texts offer broad and inclusive meanings, while specific texts provide detailed and limited instructions.

Unconditioned texts present statements without restrictions, and conditioned texts include particular stipulations or qualifications.

The challenge for interpreting both general and specific texts lies in the process of reconciling discrepancies between two related texts. Scholars must integrate and harmonize these texts to derive a coherent understanding. Similarly, the challenge for unconditioned and conditioned texts involves reconciling texts that include specific conditions with those that do not, especially when addressing the same topic.

Scholars address these challenges by developing and establishing scientific methodologies found in the various Ilm (knowledge) sciences. This involves using principles of usul al-fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence), employing logic, and applying systematic approaches to interpret and reconcile texts accurately.

Defining meanings of ‘commands’ and ‘prohibitions’

Scholars must define the different meanings of commands and prohibitions to accurately interpret Islamic texts. Understanding what a command indicates is crucial for discerning whether an action is obligatory, recommended, or merely permissible. In general, commands often signify obligations, meaning they indicate what is halal (permissible) or haram (forbidden). However, there are also 21 other possible meanings for a command, which can indicate various nuances such as recommending an action, allowing permissibility, or clarifying a particular matter.

There are two primary principles of commands. First, commands relate to propriety, meaning they guide proper conduct and behavior in religious and social contexts. Second, commands pertain to worldly matters, providing guidance on how to navigate everyday life according to Islamic principles. By understanding these principles, scholars are better equipped to interpret the broader implications of commands and prohibitions within Islamic law.

Understanding ‘indicating’ Prophetic actions

There are 3 different understandings for indicating Prophetic actions:

  1. Prophetic habits.
  2. Prophetic norms.
  3. Specific actions vs. general teaching. There are three different understandings for indicating Prophetic actions in Islamic scholarship. The first is Prophetic habits. These are sunnan, or practices, that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) engaged in as part of his personal and worldly habits. There is no blame on a person for not following these habits; however, if one follows them out of love and respect, they are rewarded for their intention, but no sin is accrued for neglecting them.

The second understanding involves Prophetic norms. These are actions that the Prophet performed frequently as part of the religion but are not necessarily obligations. Examples include performing the Duha prayer or the practice of praying 20 rakats of Taraweeh in congregation at the masjid. Following these norms is considered commendable and virtuous, but they are not mandatory.

The third understanding relates to the differentiation between specific actions and general teachings. Certain specific commands of the Prophet can ostensibly contradict his general guidance. For example, the specific command to not face the Qibla while relieving oneself appears to contradict the general teaching of respect towards the Qibla. Schools of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) interpret these apparent contradictions by reconciling between the texts using established methodologies. For instance, the Hanafi usuli principle tends to avoid exceptions, preferring clear and overarching principles from the texts to maintain coherence in interpretation.

Different judgements on soundness of hadith

There are three key areas that cause different judgments on the soundness of hadith:

  1. Strength of hadith as a matter of independent reasoning (ijtihad).
  2. Difference on narrator’s strength.
  3. Difference regarding mursal hadith. The first area is the strength of hadith as determined by ijtihad, or independent reasoning. Scholars may exercise their reasoning differently and arrive at various conclusions about the reliability and authenticity of certain hadiths. The second area involves differences in assessing the strength of narrators. A narrator’s reliability is a matter of meticulous scrutiny, and scholars may disagree on whether a narrator meets the criteria for trustworthiness. The third area concerns differences regarding mursal hadith, which are hadith wherein a successor narrates directly from the Prophet without mentioning the Companion intermediary. This type of hadith often sparks varied evaluations among scholars.

Determining the soundness of hadith involves multiple challenges, primarily due to the many nuances inherent in hadith studies. It is crucial not to take a reductionist approach to hadith, as this could lead to oversimplifications and misjudgments about their authenticity. Evaluating a narrator’s strength, for example, is a nuanced process involving an in-depth examination of their life, memory, and integrity. Scholars must navigate these complexities carefully to ensure that their judgments about the soundness of hadith are well-founded and accurate.

Different understandings on Companion opinions

There are different understandings of the Sahaba’s (companions of the Prophet) opinions within Islamic scholarship. Historically, the Malikis and Hanafis have generally aligned on one side of the interpretation, whereas the Shafi’is have often taken a different approach. The general principle held by scholars is that the words of the Prophet take precedence over the understanding of the Sahaba. However, the Hanafi and Maliki schools make an exception to this principle: if most of the senior companions understood something in a particular way, then their understanding can contextualize and inform the interpretation of the hadith.

For example, consider the practice of performing the Sunna prayer before Maghrib. According to Shafi’i scholars, the Prophet emphasized this prayer three times, indicating its importance, and thus they include it in their practice. However, none of the senior Sahabas or the first Caliphs practiced this prayer, nor was it observed in the early period following the Prophet’s death. Therefore, both the Hanafi and Maliki schools consider it makruh (disliked). Another example involves the issue of praying during the khutba (sermon), where similar differences in the understanding of the Sahaba’s practices lead to varying rulings among the different schools of thought.

Differences in secondary evidences

There are two main differences when considering secondary evidences in Islamic jurisprudence. First, there is the practice of Ahl al-Madina (the people of Medina) versus singular texts. Ahl al-Madina refers to the collective practices and legal precedents established by the people of Medina, thought to reflect the Prophet’s practices most accurately. Second is the concept of legal preference (istihsan), where certain legal rulings may be preferred due to their perceived benefits and practical implications. These differences are discussed in detail in works such as “Khinn Athar al-Adilla al-Mukhtalaf Fiha.”

Muslims in Medina sometimes practiced differently from what singular texts might indicate. For them, the collective legal practices and preferences of the community often outweighed the direct command of a singular text. This approach was based on the belief that the practices of Ahl al-Madina represented a holistic and practical application of the Prophet’s teachings.

Differences also arise between the various Islamic schools of thought (madhhabs) regarding these practices. Shafi’i scholars take issue with placing community practices over textual commands, arguing that textual commands should be followed as obligatory (fard) over the practices of Ahl al-Madina. Conversely, Hanafi and Maliki scholars maintain that the practices of Ahl al-Madina are wajib (mandatory) and should take precedence over the legal preferences found in singular texts. This divergence in methodology underscores the rich diversity within Islamic jurisprudence in interpreting and applying secondary evidences.

Differences in decisive and non-decisive texts

When considering decisive (qat’i) and non-decisive (dhanni) texts, there are distinct differences among the various Islamic schools of thought. The Hanafi school maintains a clear distinction between decisive texts, which are unambiguous and authoritative, and non-decisive texts, which are open to interpretation and less conclusive. On the other hand, the Shafi’i school treats all texts as established and gives them a similar level of consideration. This difference in approach illustrates how the various madhhabs (schools of thought) employ distinct methodologies when interpreting these types of texts.

Examples of these differences in practice include issues such as stillness in ruku (the bowing position in prayer), the recitation of Surah Al-Fatiha during Salah (prayer), and the option to cancel a contract before parting ways. These practices highlight the varying interpretations of what constitutes decisive and non-decisive evidence and how they are applied in legal rulings.

The general principle when considering differences in understanding is to acknowledge a primary legal reasoning that has a ruling. However, scholars also take into account secondary considerations, viewing the ruling through a lens of secondary preference. This means that while a ruling based on a primary text might be established, scholars consider secondary texts to ensure the ruling is not necessarily inconsistent with the general command, even if it appears contrary to the most evident reasoning available. This approach allows for a more nuanced and flexible application of Islamic law, accommodating the complexity and diversity of real-life situations.