Non-cognitivism asserts there are no moral properties or facts. Moral statements are susceptible to being true or false, thus, they merely express desires or attitudes.
Cognitivism is the denial of non-cognitivism wherein moral statements do express beliefs, thus, are susceptible to being true or false. Note that David Hume made siginificant arguments against cognitivism, and Kant argued for it.
Emotivism is a principal type of non-cognitivism. It is the doctrine that all evaluative judgements and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character. In other words, moral judgments are merely statements of how one feels, or are an expression of one’s attitude. Moral statements, therefore, are not factual assertions. For example, to say “murder is wrong” is only to say “I disapprove of murder.”
One of the modern problems in society, culture, and cognition today is that, in general, most people are no longer critical thinkers, for a variety of reasons and causes, and as a result instead opt-in for emotive thinking largely unwittingly. This mindset is generally borne out of broader issues like sub-par educational systems, information overload and social media resulting in sensationalism over accuracy, cognitive biases, distrust in expertise, problems in authority, cultural relativistic and postmodernistic tendencies that emphasis subjective interpretations of truth, and the polarization of the individual being driven into echo chambers.
Were people to learn that they are not critical thinkers and are victimizing themselves to non-cognitivism and emotivistic thinking, if they are intelligent, they would seek to get themselves out of their situation. This is moreso truer for the believer, as it was stated above, that emotivism is a doctrine. In the doctrine of the Muslim, there is not concept or belief that agrees with emotivism. And this is not only a problem in the Muslim world but the world at large.
One reason emotivism prevails is not recognizing or refuting fact/value distinctions. This is called the ‘no ought from an is’ problem. For example, premise A states humans dies if you electrocute them (fact). Premise B states that Susan is a human (fact). These two premises are facts. The conclusion and value proposition is that, therefore, one ought not to electrocute Susan.
The non-cognitivist would refute this reasoning because they argue that the conclusion contains a value judgment (“ought not to electrocute Susan”) that cannot be logically derived from purely factual premises. Non-cognitivists maintain that factual statements about the world do not inherently contain or imply moral values or duties. In this example, the premises only describe a factual state of affairs (what happens when humans are electrocuted and Susan’s status as a human). The leap to a prescriptive conclusion involves an additional element that cannot be derived purely from these facts.
Non-cognitivists might argue that to reach a conclusion about what one ought to do, you must include a normative premise (an additional premise expressing a value judgment or moral principle) that itself is not purely factual. For instance, one might add a premise like “It is wrong to cause unnecessary harm to humans,” which itself requires moral assessment beyond straightforward fact.
Emotivists would suggest that the statement “one ought not to electrocute Susan” reflects a speaker’s emotional disapproval of electrocution or a societal norm rather than a logical derivation from the premises. According to emotivism, the conclusion is more an expression of an emotional attitude or a persuasive attempt to influence behavior, rather than a factual claim.
In summary, non-cognitivists refute the direct derivation of value-laden conclusions from purely factual premises by emphasizing the need for a distinct normative element, typically characterized as an expression of emotion or a commitment to a moral norm, which cannot be captured by factual language alone.
Cognitivism, on the other hand, holds that moral statements are capable of being true or false because they express propositions about the world. From this perspective, there is more to moral statements than mere expressions of emotion or prescriptions; they are claims that can be evaluated for their truth value.
Based on the example above cognitivists would hold to moral realism; believing that moral facts exist independently of human feelings or perceptions. In this view, statements about what “ought” to be done can be true in the same way as factual statements about what “is.” Therefore, the conclusion “one ought not to electrocute Susan” could be true or false based on objective moral facts or truths, such as the inherent wrongness of causing harm to a person.
Also cognitivists can argue that it is possible to bridge the gap between “is” and “ought” by introducing moral facts that can underpin moral reasoning. For instance, a moral fact might be that it is objectively wrong to cause unnecessary harm. If one accepts this moral fact, cognitivists would assert that it is then coherent to move from the factual premises to a moral conclusion.
Also cognitivists supports that moral reasoning involves rational deliberation based on principles and evidence. Rational agents can assess moral claims for their truth value by appealing to ethical theories, principles, and moral facts. This process resembles scientific reasoning and builds a rational bridge from descriptive statements to prescriptive conclusions.
Also cognitivists might argue that the argument contains implicit normative assumptions that can be rationally evaluated. For example, there may be a normative premise such as “one ought not to cause intentional harm to others unless justified,” which can function as a moral rule subject to analysis and debate.
In summary, cognitivism challenges the non-cognitivist view by asserting that moral statements are not mere expressions of emotion or commands but are propositions that can be true or false. This allows for rational evaluation and justification of moral conclusions based on objective or intersubjective moral truths, thus potentially overcoming the “is-ought” gap through the incorporation of moral facts or principles in ethical reasoning.
From an Islamic perspective, affirming the nature of morality through doctrine from revelation and authentic tradition, and the role of human reason in understanding ethical truths, are sufficient to determine Muslims as not only cognitivists but champions in affirming moral truth.
Islam affirms objective morality through the Divine commandments of Allah. All moral values stem from the Will of Allah, Who is the Source of all Truth. This aligns with a form of cognitivism because it posits that moral statements correspond to divine commands, which can be objectively true or false. For instance, if Allah commands for justice in Divine Revelation, then “justice is good” is an objectively true statement.
The Quran and prophetic traditions provide clear and authentic moral guidance such that moral truths can be known and articulated propositionally. This aligns with cognitivism because the Quran and Sunnah are viewed as conveying factual moral claims, which Muslims are required to understand, interpret, and apply.
Scholars like Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd have argued that human reason is a gift from God to discern moral truths and apply them in varying contexts. This reflects cognitivism’s premise that moral statements are subject to rational evaluation and truth-value assessment.
Moral realism exists in real-life fiqh (jurisprudence). The practice of fiqh involves deriving legal rulings based on the Qur’an, Hadith, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). This process rests on the belief that there are correct answers to moral and ethical questions, indicative of cognitivism’s commitment to objective moral truths.
Islam teaches that humans are accountable for their actions and will be judged by Allah based on their adherence to moral and ethical principles. This presumes that moral truths are knowable and that individuals can understand and act upon these truths, consistent with a cognitivist framework.
Islam contains universal moral values. The religion teachings endorse certain moral values as universally binding (e.g., justice, charity, honesty), suggesting an objective moral order that transcends individual emotions or cultural relativism, which cognitivism supports.
By drawing on these theological and philosophical aspects, one can argue within an Islamic framework that moral statements have truth values and that cognitivism accurately reflects the nature of Islamic ethics as objective, rational, and divinely grounded.